

The Effect of Energy Security on Future Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations

Essay

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Abstract

In the world, long enough shadowed by a sluggish institutional approach to climate change, a recent geopolitical shift that originated from the combined effect of the EU energy dependency on Russia, the war in Ukraine, and frequent black swans, such as COVID-19 pandemics in this case, brought with it an exigency to boldly face new threats that emerge from it. In that world, the EU has founded its fortuitous site under the strategic goal of “*strategic autonomy*”¹. Moreover, one branch of that broad term that is particularly endangered and, if neglected, could potentially put the whole concept in question is energy security. Considering the importance of energy security² and respecting the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions and operations as the major and only tangible strategic and operational leverage for the EU to position itself in an increasingly contested energy security world in the formation process of the EU “*strategic autonomy*” concept, this paper aims to research, notice, and describe the impact of energy security to future CSDP missions and operations for the sake of envisaging the importance of that topic, with the emphasis on introducing the future key operational personnel of CSDP missions and operations and providing those with a brief insight into the changes of emerging energy situation and the EU strategic needs placed before them. It includes the emerging operational details regarding energy security in the context of energy security and their broad geostrategic backgrounds. The research was done with the aim of comparing the EU strategic narrative concerning energy security with the real data of the CSDP missions and operations. The period before the emergence of the new energy situation (prior to COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war that drastically changed the world’s energy market) and the period that followed, all the way to October 2023, were compared (time of research). Correlations were then used to predict future trends while taking credible scientific insights into account. Finally, the study paper summarises the author’s views on how to find security for the EU while also ensuring justice for the environment and the rest of the world – something the EU has committed to doing.³

¹ Cf.: Damen, M. (2022). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023. European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels. P.3,4,5

² Cf.: Versailles Declaration (2022). Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government. Declaration. P.3

³ Cf.: Halleux, V. (2023). EU nature restoration regulation. European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels. Brief. P.1

Keywords: CSDP, missions and operations, energy security, “*strategic autonomy*”, geopolitics,

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2. Preface

With the modern age and, consequently, the modern machine economy, energy has paired with food as a major factor in the process of directing the interests of the states towards conflict. Devastating world wars show how the possession of energy sources and transition routes guarantees a painful bleeding to your enemy by channelling their strategic choices into hasty, short-term actions.⁴ From then on, energy sources, starting with coal in 1951 with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and nuclear power with the emerging of the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957, were major initiators of a new international resource management system that had never been seen before.⁵ Although at the time still in infancy, the newly established political platform, the EU, showed that energy-related conflicts could be mitigated and even eliminated and that broader and ageing national animosities might disappear by focusing on the common goal – just by governing the resources. This time, renewable sources, technological capacities, and knowledge⁶ must be well governed not only to prevent conflicts from spreading but also to protect humanity from its own devastating actions. Therefore, the EU, with its proven peacebuilding and just governing capabilities, must take that responsibility and proactively engage in the present rip current of chaos.⁷ This paper provides a brief insight into the utilisation of Europe’s most potent tool for this cause: the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The impact of that engagement would be crucial for future operational personnel on the ground and at sea, allowing for a more productive self-preparation of young officers, CSDP participants, and the group this paper’s author aspires to join.

⁴ Statement by the author

⁵ Cf.: Homepage of Planete energies- Europe's Energy History: a Story with Twists and Turns. URL: <https://www.planete-energies.com/en/media/article/europes-energy-history-story-twists-and-turns> . [04-11-23]

⁶ Cf.: Damen, M. (2022). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023. Op.cit. P.11

⁷ Cf.: Popkostova, Y. (2023). The Power Shift. Chaillot paper 177. EUISS, Paris. P.3-7

3. Introduction

From the onset of common EU strategic thought, energy security (described as “having stable access to energy sources on a timely, sustainable, and affordable basis”) was identified as an integral part of the EU strategic autonomy objective. The values this objective is based upon are sovereignty of states and individual freedom from outside interference. A way to defend those values is to actively engage in finding and securing new energy sources by utilising the EU’s major power projection tool, the Common Security and Defence Policy missions.⁸ CSDP activities are described as policies under which “*the EU takes a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and the strengthening of international security*”⁹ Moreover, they “*promote peace and security where needed, providing stability and building resilience in fragile environments.*”¹⁰ Indeed, CSDP missions are the most active and desirable acting vectors for achieving a secure and resilient Union.

The word “mission” describes the final state that the system intends to accomplish and represents civilian CSDP activity¹¹, while the word “operation” stands for military activity¹² and is defined as “*a sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose*”¹³ that correspond with the planning of operations and practical utilisation of technical capabilities. From that, it can be concluded that the impact of a comprehensive policy such as energy security must also be comprehensive and reach both the strategic and operational levels. In strategic terms, it means identifying potential new CSDP missions and naming their goals, i.e., the intended end state that system must achieve to secure energy.¹⁴ On the other hand, operational impact is embodied in new potential doctrine and technical capabilities needed for executive-type CSDP activities.¹⁵

The European Union describes its position regarding energy in the European Green Deal as follows: “*The EU will continue to lead international efforts and wants to build alliances with the*

⁸ Cf.: Tardy, T. (2015). CSDP in action; What contribution to international security?. Chaillot paper 134. EUISS, Paris. P.17

⁹Homepage of EEAS. Page Missions and operations. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en. [04-11-23]

¹⁰ Cf.: Ibid.

¹¹ Cf.: Tardy, T. (2015). CSDP in action; What contribution to international security? Op.cit. P.17

¹² Cf.: Ibid.

¹³ Homepage of NATO dictionary. Term-operation. URL: <https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc>. [02-11-23]

¹⁴ Conclusion made by the author

¹⁵ Statement by the author

like-minded. It also recognises the need to maintain its security of supply and competitiveness even when others are unwilling to act."¹⁶ From there, the strain to connect energy security to CSDP missions and operations is obvious, but the exact relations and, furthermore, their impact are not. To this date, official strategic documents describing the impact of EU energy security on CSDP missions are close to non-existent. The problems behind that are the enormous geopolitical opportunity costs of not preparing and not acting appropriately during this great world shift marked by climate activism, energy shortages, increasing hostilities in multiple world regions, a slowing of globalism, and intensive multipolarism.¹⁷ What is more, the operational outcomes of inaction could be poor; the CSDP forces' technological adaptation might put their lives and ability to conduct operations at risk. This paper will try to build a comprehensive and trustworthy picture of the impact of energy security on future CSDP missions and operations under the research approach by analysing connections between energy security and CSDP missions yesterday, today, and tomorrow. The primary database on EU energy security under that timely divided comparative approach will be related strategic documents, and on the side of CSDP missions and operations, it will be their data. Firstly, chosen strategic documents, comparison criteria, and missions and operations data will be presented in the "Current State of Research" chapter, then compared and presented in the "Research and Results of Research" chapter, all while answering the sub-questions introduced in the "Research Questions". The answer to the final main research question is given by presenting an overall conclusion along with the author's own views in "Discussion of Results and Conclusion". The main idea behind this approach is that analysing how the energy security strategy impacted CSDP missions and operations in the past and how it impacts them today is the best way to analyse and predict how it will affect them in the future.

¹⁶ European Commission. (2019). The European Green Deal. Brussels.

¹⁷ Cf.: Popkostova, Y. (2023). The Power Shift. Chailot paper 177. Op.Cit. P.3-7

4. Current State of Research

In this phase, the exact criteria for gathering the research materials were determined after conducting a comprehensive study of all available materials and will be presented below. The research framework and confines are constructed in the form of a timeframe and derivated from the principle of analysing connections between the energy security and CSDP missions yesterday, today, and tomorrow, as presented in Figure 1. For practical purposes, October 2023 is used to represent the future at the time this paper is being written, and the crisis timeline continues to that date.




Figure 1. Timeline of global energy situations¹⁸

Research material is prearranged according to the same timeline and divided into precrisis, crisis, and future, with the exception of some crisis energy security strategic documents, which must be an integral part of the future impact due to their long-term goals, although their political context is observed as a part of the crisis strategic narrative. Strategic documents were selected on the basis of their far-reaching character and cornerstone role in shaping EU foreign affairs generally and energy security specifically. All for the purpose that, by analysing the long-term narrative, it would be possible to draw a conclusion and, only then, form a base for the comparison to real CSDP missions and operations.¹⁹

¹⁸ Figure made by the author

¹⁹ Methodology designed by author

They are:

- Precrisis energy security narrative
 - European Security Strategy²⁰
 - Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union²¹
 - European Union Global Strategy²²
 - European Green Deal²³
- Crisis energy security narrative
 - REPower EU²⁴
 - EU External Energy Strategy²⁵
 - EU Strategic Compass²⁶

Missions' data that would primarily be observed are strategic location, character, and time. They will be observed through the lenses of the energy security strategic narrative in order to find the connecting factors and create the EU *modus operandi* for conducting energy security interests on the ground as part of a larger strategic agenda.²⁷ That procedure would be repeated for both the precrisis and crisis timeframes. In such a way, a comparative base between pre-crisis and crisis CSDP missions' execution under energy security aspects will be developed. Current research operations and missions' data are presented in Table 1.

²⁰ Cf.: European Security Strategy. (2003). Brussels.

²¹ Cf.: European Commission. (2015). A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. Energy Union Package. Brussels

²² Cf.: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. (2016). Brussels

²³ Cf.: European commission. (2019). The European Green Deal. Op. Cit.

²⁴ Cf.: European commission. (2022). REPowerEU Plan. Brussels.

²⁵ Cf.: European commission. (2022). EU external energy engagement in a changing world. Brussels.


²⁶ Cf.: European Union Strategic Compass (2022). Brussels.


²⁷ Criteria chosen by author.

Mission	Commence year	Mission character
EUFOR Althea	2004.	military
EUPOL COPS Palestinian territories	2006	civilian
EULEX Kosovo	2008	civilian
EUMM Georgia	2008	civilian
EUTM Somalia	2010	military
EUCAP Sahel Niger	2012	civilian
EUBAM Libya	2013.	civilian
EUTM Mali	2013.	military
EUAM Ukraine	2014.	civilian
EUCAP Sahel Mali	2015.	civilian
EUTM RCA15	2016.	military
EUCAP Somalia	2016.	civilian
EUAM Iraq	2017.	civilian
EUBAM Rafah	2017.	civilian
EUNAFOR Iriini	2020.	military
EUTM Mozambique	2021.	military
EUMAM Ukraine	2022.	military
EUMPM Niger	2023.	military
EUPM Moldova	2023.	civilian

Table 1. CSDP missions' activity and data^{28,29}

According to the parent agency of EEAS, table includes:

 Precrisis missions

 Crisis missions

²⁸ Table made by the author.

²⁹ Source of data: Homepage of EEAS. Page Missions and operations. Op. Cit.

5. Research Gap

There are neither publicly available official documents nor papers that combine the EU strategy of energy security, CSDP missions and operations, and the geopolitical challenges of the emerging modern world. This particular gap represents the potential danger of neglecting the active changes of the CSDP policy on a strategic level and allowing the stream of changes model our CSDP activities due to inertia. It is of crucial importance to use all the information available to prepare our forces on a strategic level by predicting potential locations and the character of missions and operations. Thus, this paper analyses the most relevant EU's strategic documents, compares them with CSDP missions' data, and challenges them against recent scientific perspectives in the fields of geopolitics and energy. From there, it offers conclusions derived from that comparison.

6. Research Questions

General research question,

How will energy security affect future common security and defence operations and missions?

can be broken down into four sub-questions as follows:

- **How did the energy security strategy impact common security missions and operations during the pre-crisis energy period?**
- **How does the crisis in energy security strategy impact common security missions and operations?**
- **What is the European future strategic energy security narrative telling us?**
- **What are described trends and threats are described by the independent security narrative?**

7. Methodology

The following research will be divided into comparing the EU energy security strategic narrative and CSDP missions and operations data separately for the precrisis, crisis, and future periods. Inside each sub-research, there will be an explanation of the conducted research and its results. The former will be depicted in a manner that can directly answer the appropriate sub-question presented above and form a sub-conclusion. In such a way, the “Research and Results of Research” chapter will consist of the 1st and 2nd sub-conclusions, while the 3rd conclusion will be presented as a closing to the conclusion as a whole and described in the “Discussion of Results and Conclusion” chapter. All are represented in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Methodology used in paper³⁰

³⁰ Figure created by the author

8. Research and Results of Research

After careful and detailed analysis of the aforementioned precrisis strategic materials, it is possible to extract key information with their metadata. Those were aggregated by first searching the terms “energy”, “security” and “energy security”, then connecting each found term to the context of the appropriate passage. Thirdly, all contexts from strategic documents were joined in order to construct the universal contexts of the energy security narrative, which would be represented below and connected with missions and operations data from Table 1.

8.1. Precrisis Energy Security Impact on CSDP Missions and Operations

Results of strategic documents and analysis of their contexts regarding energy security are as shown:

- **The European Security Strategy (2003):** The first comprehensive overview of common European security is notable for its ideal, too ambitious goals of globally voluntary acceptance and implementation of European values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In it, although sub standardly cited, the roots of the energy security policy can be found through statements that recognise energy import dependency as a threat to the security of the EU as a whole.³¹
- **The Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union (2015)** concentrates on diversification of demand by strengthening trading relationships with Norway, the USA, and Canada, not excluding Russia as a supplier, but at the same time recognising the importance of Ukraine as a transit partner. Furthermore, it embraces the integration of the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) into the new energy system, which implies mass financial and technological investments from the EU. Moreover, it sets aside Central Asia as a strategic new supplier and Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe as key transition directions.³²
- **The European Union Global Strategy (2016)** perceives old dependency with fresh eyes and starts from the old conclusion that “*energy insecurity endangers our people and*

³¹ European Security Strategy. (2003). Op. Cit. Passim.

³² European Commission. (2015). A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. Op. Cit. Passim.

territory.”³³ “Through our energy diplomacy, we will strengthen relations worldwide with reliable energy-producing and transit countries and support the establishment of infrastructure to allow diversified sources to reach European markets.”³⁴ Global strategy then defines the geopolitical sphere of crucial interests regarding managing energy security with future energy diplomacy partners, which are: the Maghreb and Middle East; Turkey as a transit state; possible cooperation with Iran; and African multilateral organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS. What is more, it emphasises strong cooperation with the USA and Canada and possible new cooperation with South America and Southeast Asia.³⁵

- **The European Green Deal (2019)**, adopted just prior to the COVID pandemic disturbance, focuses largely on green and renewable sources and tackles energy problems from the viewpoint of environmental policy. Once again, it highlights cooperation with African states and multilateral organisations, particularly regarding their enormous green and renewable potentials.³⁶

Researching the correlation between energy security strategy as a source of operating guidelines and actual CSDP missions has been done as follows: The mission’s primarily observed data were strategic location, character, and time. They were observed through the lenses of the energy security strategic narrative to find connecting factors and create the EU *modus operandi* for conducting energy security interests on the ground as part of a larger strategic agenda.

³³ A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. (2016). Op. cit. P. 9

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid. Passim.

³⁶ European Commission. (2019). The European Green Deal. Op. Cit. Passim.




Figure 3. Status of CSDP mission location regarding pre-crisis energy security narrative³⁷

Besides location, a relevant factor is also time. Since the European Union Global Strategy stands as the cornerstone of the external action of the EU, it is possible to divide them from there.




Figure 4. Strategic timeframe contexts of precrisis missions and operations³⁸

According to the high percentage of regions mentioned in the EU energy security context corresponding to CSDP missions' locations, there are evident relations. At first sight, it seems strange that the majority of CSDP missions preceded strategic determination. However, the fact is that the major reason for each mission was a sovereign government invitation for a certain class of missions. From that, the conclusion can be drawn that a large part of the pre-crisis partnership relied on previous partners where the EU had already been present and that new missions were largely operational upgrades, as in the cases of Somalia, RCA, Sahel.³⁹ Noticeable is also the

³⁷ Figure created by the author.

³⁸ Figure created by the author.

³⁹ Sub conclusion made by the author.

civilian mission and operation character, with 75% consisting mostly of advisory and capacity-building sectors.




Figure 5. Character of precrisis missions and operations⁴⁰

To summarise, the answer to the first sub-question (How did energy security strategy affect common security missions and operations during the pre-crisis energy period?) can be made as follows:

Indeed, the pre-crisis EU security narrative, after a long initial period of inaction, eventually outlined certain strategic goals, but without mentioning concrete doctrinal and operational changes. The locations of the mentioned energy suppliers correspond to those on the lists of the CSDP missions, but not due to a strong strategic foresight capability. The CSDP missions relied on previous partnerships for their back-up, i.e., the energy security strategy included the regions with already active CSDP missions at that moment. Furthermore, a large majority of them had a civilian character. All in all, it is safe to say that during the precrisis period, the energy security strategy did not impact the CSDP missions and operations. Rather, it indicated that the strategic narrative was not prepared earlier but was tailored according to the current moment.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Figure created by the author.

⁴¹ Author's opinion

8.2. Crisis Energy Security Impact on CSDP Missions and Operations

- After careful analysis of energy security during crisis times and connecting their contents, the following strategic documents can be summarised accordingly:
- **REPower EU (2020):** forming a common purchasing mechanism open to the Western Balkans and ENP, developing new technology, and building energy corridors as part of the 2015 EU Framework Strategy.⁴²
- **The EU external energy strategy (2022)** involves energy-related contracts with Israel, Egypt, Algeria, and Azerbaijan and potential contracts with sub-Saharan Africa. The EU offers technical and intellectual assistance for the introduction of new energy-efficient technologies, such as methane capture. In addition, it promotes new fuels like hydrogen and upgrades the common energy market.⁴³
- **The EU's Strategic Compass (2022)** emphasises the reduction of the environmental footprint of the European armed forces, especially in CSDP missions and operations. Thus, it is opening a completely new operative niche besides geopolitical impacts.⁴⁴

Energy security strategy documents written during the crisis period were analysed as references to that time, presenting their narratives, ideas, and progress as an echo of that period. As a result, the research and results that followed were made in that regard. However, in the absence of the latest strategic documents, future conclusions will also use their undeniable value and long-term goals to predict future CSDP missions and operations in chapter conclusions, giving them even more credibility due to the measurement made by the same norms and legislation. The most striking segment of the EU crisis energy security narrative stated concrete strategic results in the form of signed contracts for the diversification of supply⁴⁵ (mainly of gas) and work progress regarding long-term methane and green hydrogen suppliers.⁴⁶ Even more indicating is the consistency with

⁴² European commission. (2022). REPowerEU Plan. Brussels. Op. Cit. Passim.

⁴³ European commission. (2022). EU external energy engagement in a changing world. Op. Cit. Passim.

⁴⁴ European Union Strategic Compass (2022). Op. Cit. Passim.

⁴⁵ Cf.: European Commission. (2022). EU external energy engagement in a changing world. Op. Cit. P. 3f

⁴⁶ Ibid. Passim.

which partners declared precrisis,⁴⁷ but along with that came the explained risks associated with long-term strategic contracts with relatively unstable states and regions.⁴⁸ The EU will, as previously stated, externally decrease this risk and secure its backyard through the ENP initiative and the so-called western Balkans and concentrate on the risks on the supply side of the chain.⁴⁹ Moreover, the EU announced a large technology and knowledge transfer operation to its suppliers to ensure a high degree of energy efficiency.⁵⁰ In recent times, the first potential operational-related measure has been noticed in relation to the EU Strategic Compass's request for energy-efficient and green CSDP missions and operations.⁵¹




Figure 6. CSDP mission location regarding crisis energy security narrative⁵²

Alongside the ongoing pre-crisis CSDP missions, of the five new ones brought up after the start of the energy crisis, four were directly or indirectly predicted by their location. EUMPM Niger, the only one from the Sahel region, is described as a potential hydrogen source and a location for renewables.⁵³ Events that began in July 2023 can serve as an extreme example of the medium- and long-term risks resulting from unprotected strategic operations (as a supplier of green hydrogen and uranium, respectively). The other three missions: Moldova, Ukraine, and IRINI [1] (Mediterranean costs of Libya, conducting a weapon embargo on Libya) represent the shifting of the pivot point of the EU CSDP missions and operations in countries that are members of the ENP

⁴⁷ Cf.: Ibid. P. 3

⁴⁸ Cf.: Ibid. P.3f

⁴⁹ Cf.: Ibid. P. 3,10f

⁵⁰ Cf.: Ibid. P. 4

⁵¹ Cf.: European Union Strategic Compass (2022). Op. Cit. P. 38f

⁵² Figure created by the author.

⁵³ Cf.: Ibid. P. 5

and Eastern partnership, the regions of strategic importance for the EU that are also mentioned in the strategic narrative, but in a different light. Fast-emerging instability has put regions, imagined as a part of the EU common energy market and the first source of energy diversification, at risk of becoming hot spots for CSDP missions and operations to sustain their partnership in the energy security field. A great warning is also the character of new crisis missions.⁵⁴




Figure 7. Character of crisis missions and operations⁵⁵

Taking into consideration the second sub-conclusion and the answer to the sub-question (How is the crisis energy security strategy affecting common security missions and operations?), it is clear that the energy security strategy brought CSDP missions and operations to the EU, leaving many questions for the future (such as how it will impact contracted cooperation and will be done on an operational level to deal with energy-efficient CSDP missions and operations, as well as whether it is really possible with the emerging new strategic struggles).⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Conclusion by the author.

⁵⁵ Figure created by the author.

⁵⁶ Author's opinion

9. Discussion of Results and Conclusions

During careful research of the pre-crisis literature, energy security was overwhelmingly used in contexts of reducing the energy demand of the EU as a whole, increasing domestic renewable energy sources, diversifying energy imports,⁵⁷ especially oil and gas in the short term, and capturing methane and green hydrogen⁵⁸ in the long run. Actions to catch up to these goals are divided into EU internal action, largely dealing with subsidising renewables and the inception of the common energy market, and external energy actions, which concern making short- and medium-term energy import contracts. Latter are thus subject to CFSP and a potentially hot spot for CSDP.^[1] On behalf of that, particular attention should be paid to the geographic and geopolitical locations of contracted suppliers. They can be divided into two groups: long-term stable strategic and reliant partners such as the United States, Norway, Canada, or potentially Australia, and a second group of other different value countries with questionable democracies, relatively unstable economies, and places in need of the CSDP mission goals.⁵⁹ Exactly that is the weak spot of the EU pre-crisis energy security narrative and the cause of the possible activation of the CSDP mission and operation mechanism. One look at Table 1 will confirm that in practice, the same regions and areas mentioned in the strategic narrative are found on the list of precrisis CSDP missions and operations.⁶⁰

The same vulnerability continues to appear in crisis periods. Although concrete strategic measures started to form, especially those placed on the long-term contracting somewhat nonstable states or uncertain security states, the risk of insurance has remained at low levels. The EU planned to draw its strategic neighbourhood closer to participating in an energy-secure Europe in the form of a common purchase mechanism or common energy market, built upon EU-borrowed knowledge and expertise.⁶¹ However, in return, it got new hot spots around itself as a direct disruptor of any other worldwide CSDP activity. Following the most recent strategic documents and current global state 3rd sub-conclusion, answering the sub-question “What is the EU future strategic energy security

⁵⁷ European Commission. (2015). A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. Op. Cit. Passim.

⁵⁸ European commission. (2022). EU external energy engagement in a changing world. Op. Cit. Passim.

⁵⁹ Divided by author.

⁶⁰ Author’s conclusion

⁶¹ Cf.: European commission. (2022). EU external energy engagement in a changing world. Op. Cit. P. 4

narrative telling us?“, the EU must strain its CSDP missions and operations capability, especially military, if it wants to keep pace with the emerging threats, which is key to strategic autonomy in its foundations.⁶²

Be that as it may, all of that did not influence the operational development of energy-efficient and secure armed forces. The first mention in the general strategic document dates as recently as 2022, and in the EU Strategic Compass, the EDA placed energy in the top ten priorities for capability development under its “Military Green” project in 2011.⁶³ That idea evolved into the creation of the Consultation Forum on Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) in 2015.⁷¹ What is more, that same year, the EU started the experimental use of renewable-sourced military camps under the project Smart Camp Technical Demonstrator as a starting point for future research and technology development.⁶⁴ For the author of this essay, the greatest step forward came in 2016 with the formation of an education, training, and exercise unit “to educate and assist them in applying a systems approach to energy management at an operational level.”⁶⁵ To this date, the major activity in that field is still data gathering, described as a main objective in the 2020 Climate Change and Defence Roadmap .⁶⁶

At the end, sometimes it is better to wait for a wiser solution than take hasty decisions. All renewable concepts carry in themselves a strong need for advanced processing industries of key materials such as rare earth's and non-ferrous metals. The capacity is already being hit by the spiralling deindustrialisation⁶⁷ due to surging electricity costs. From there, a potentially hazardous crossroad appears. The first path is to rely on renewable technologies or material imports, a sector where China rules the market⁶⁸ and fell into the trap of replacing old dependencies with new ones.⁶⁹ The second path, looking tempting from a “strategic autonomy” perspective, is providing domestic

⁶² Author's conclusion

⁶³ Cf.: Homepage of EDA. Page Captech Energy and Environment. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/energy-and-environment-programme> . [05-11-23]

⁶⁴ Cf.: European Defence Matters. (2016). Sustaining Europe's Armed Forces. Brussels. Issue 11.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Cf.: Council of the European Union. (2020). Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. Brussels.

⁶⁷ Cf.: Thiran G. et al. (2022). Europe's non-ferrous metals producers call for emergency EU action to prevent permanent deindustrialisation from spiralling electricity and gas prices. Eurometaux. Brussels.

⁶⁸ Cf.: Popkostova, Y. (2023). The Power Shift. Chailot paper 177. Op. cit. P.55

⁶⁹ Cf.: Homepage of European Council on Foreign Relations. Page tracking Europe's energy security: Four lessons from the EU's new energy deals. URL: <https://ecfr.eu/article/tracking-europes-energy-security-four-lessons-from-the-eus-new-energy-deals/> . [05-11-23]

industry with large quantities of short-term energy sources (preferably gas) and subsidising them. That would make European processing companies competitive again and able to satisfy the soaring demand created by EU common production projects of solar panels and batteries. The point where strategic and operational changes came together was to produce large quantities of renewable sources and energy storage, according to the second option. By buying large quantities of natural gas, the EU will definitely saturate the global LNG market, raise global prices even with a common buying strategy, and thus disable the only energy sources for some relatively unstable states like Sri Lanka⁷⁰, destabilising the world future and creating even more threats to its own energy security and potential new CSDP missions in needy states.⁷¹

Whether it is buying processed materials or further destabilising some regions, the EU, while conducting its energy security policy, endangered its own integrity, which it proudly acquired as the only supranational organisation successful in creating true peace by just sharing resources on its continent. That role is greatly questionable if we don't stick together with our common values for the benefit of the whole world. Otherwise, all future EU external policy will be pale and worthless.⁷²

⁷⁰ Cf.: Popkostova, Y. (2023). The Power Shift. Chailot paper 177. Op. cit. P.77

⁷¹ Conclusion made by Author.

⁷² Conclusion made by Author.

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

CF SEDSS - Consultation Forum on Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy

COVID - Coronavirus disease

CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy

EDA - European Defence Agency

EEAS - European External Action Service

ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy

EUAM - European Union Advisory Mission

EUBAM - EU Border Management Assistance Mission

EUCAP - European Union Capacity Building Mission

EUCAP - EU Capacity Building Mission

EU - European Union

EUFOR - EU Force

EUISS - European Union Institute for Security Studies

EULEX - EU Rule of Law Mission

EUMAM - European Union Assistance Mission

EUMM - EU Monitoring Mission

EUMPM - European Union Military Partnership Mission

EUNAFOR - EU Naval Force

EUPM - European Union Partnership Mission

EUPOL - EU Police Mission

EUTM - European Union Training Mission

EUTM - European Union Training Mission

LNG - Liquefied natural gas

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

RACC - Regional Advisory and Coordinating Centre

RCA - Central African Republic/Républiqu Centrafricaine

USA - United States of America

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10.3 List of Tables

Table 1. CSDP missions' activity and data

10.4. List of literature

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
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11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions that plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay and exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e., if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.



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(Officer Cadet Vilim Đura)

Split, Croatia in November 2023